GLENNON - FMT.DOC

09/20/01 9:27 AM

EXPENDABLE CHILDREN: DEFINING BELONGING IN A
BROKEN WORLD
THERESA GLENNON*
Children’s happiness is always hostage to adults’ care and common sense. The
objectification of children will persist despite law, just as servitude outlasted
slavery. Yet I continue to believe that law could tell a less possessive and more
selfless story to parents, one that is centered not in parents’ rights but in chil1
dren’s needs.

I. INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute has tackled one of the most deeply contentious
and emotional areas of law in a remarkably logical and moderate manner. Family dissolution, especially when it involves a lengthy relationship or children,
shatters the dreams and disrupts every aspect of the lives of those involved. Just
as the legal system cannot return health to one severely injured in an accident, it
cannot restore the wholeness of the dissolving family. While some families
navigate the difficult transition smoothly, many find themselves engaged in
stressful negotiations or litigation. Post-separation outcomes which place children in poverty or at the center of ongoing battles undermines their well-being
and development. The perpetuation of anger prevalent at the time of family
2
dissolution also negatively affects the lives of all involved.
While law cannot reunify the family, it can reduce the areas open to dispute, allow former partners to negotiate “in the shadow” of clear and fair rules,
and provide judges coherent and manageable guidelines. The ALI’s Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution go a long way toward achieving those goals. In
light of the notable achievements of the Principles—too numerous to describe
here—I only reluctantly undertake a critical analysis of the Principles concerning
the definition of parent for purposes of child support. The Principles’ child support section required the drafters to define who the “parents” are who have
rights and responsibilities under that section. The primary definition of “par-
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ent” is a person “who is defined as a parent under state law.” The difficulty
with the primary definition is that state laws define “parent” in various ways.
Due to varied definitions, the Principles seek to establish greater uniformity and
fairness in the definition of parent for the purposes of child support.
In their effort to achieve uniformity and fairness, the ALI tackled the nettlesome clash among paternity presumptions, social fatherhood, and the new genetic technologies that unequivocally determine biological paternity. The Principles define a category of “parent by estoppel” that details the rights of nonbiological parents who claim custodial and decisionmaking responsibility for
4
children. The Principles also delineate circumstances in which individuals who
are not defined as parents under state law are estopped to deny a parental sup5
port obligation. In this commentary, I focus on this second definition of estoppel to deny a parental support obligation which raises vexatious and imponderable dilemmas for judges and legislators and those who seek to guide their
lawmaking.
This commentary provides a brief background on some of the circumstances in which states currently provide conflicting and often unsatisfying
resolutions regarding paternity, and thus responsibility for children born during
the marriage or cohabitation of a couple. Second, it describes the Principles’ efforts to address the inconsistencies and inadequacies of state paternity laws by
adopting the concept of estoppel to deny parental support obligation. Finally,
this commentary offers a critical evaluation of these efforts. While some aspects
of the estoppel to deny a child support obligation are important steps forward,
other aspects do not adequately resolve the most troubling situations that currently arise in the child support context when biological paternity comes into
dispute.
The Principles are important for their equalization of the treatment of children born during marriage and during the cohabitation of their parents and for
granting legal effect to explicit or implicit agreements to support children. The
Principles’ approach to estoppel is hamstrung, however, by several factors, including: 1) a failure to provide clear guidelines to judicial discretion, 2) an
overly optimistic reading of the current caselaw concerning estoppel in disputed
paternity situations, 3) failure to resolve an extraordinarily difficult logical dilemma, and 4) blindness to the deep and often gendered assumptions concerning morality that judges have invoked. While the Principles strive to find an
equilibrium between fairness to adults and fairness to children in these perplexing situations, they have yet to make a strong case that the balance sought
has been achieved. I argue that the Principles should consider a different approach, one that re-envisions parents as fiduciaries and creates greater certainty
by strictly limiting judicial discretion.

3. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§
2.03(1)(a), 3.02(1)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 2000].
4. Id. § 2.03(1)(b).
5. Id. § 3.02A. I am advised by Professor Grace Ganz Blumberg that this section will be renumbered as § 3.03. Email from Grace Ganz Blumberg, Reporter, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION, to author (Feb. 21, 2001) (on file with author). Since at this time the only published
draft describes it as § 3.02A, I will use this numbering system in this commentary.
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II. CHILDREN OF UNCERTAIN PARENTAGE
Struggles to determine the legal paternity of children date back to ancient
6
times. Until recently, maternity has rarely come into question, but paternity has
often been subject to attack. English common law considered children born out
of wedlock to have no father, while it presumed that children born to a married
7
mother were the offspring of the mother’s husband. The circumstances in
8
which legal paternity comes into question vary widely. Unwed mothers who
are financially able to support their children may choose not to establish their
child’s paternity. However, mothers in need of financial assistance to raise their
children may be required to either establish their children’s paternity or maintain a presumption of paternity that has arisen in a particular man. Mothers
who wish to eliminate a social or presumed father from their children’s lives
may challenge a presumption of paternity or seek to establish paternity in another man. Some biological fathers may seek to establish their paternity, while
other men may seek to deny paternity at birth or at any time later in the life of a
child.
The most common challenge to paternity at the time of family dissolution
involves a husband’s assertion that he is not the biological father of children
born during the marriage and bears no legal responsibility for their future financial support. Less often, a wife may claim that someone other than her husband
is the biological father and that the husband should therefore be denied visitation or custody of the children born during the marriage—or an alleged biological father will seek to establish his paternity of one or more of the children born
during the marriage.
This commentary focuses on the disclaimer of parental support obligation
9
by men who have been serving as the fathers of children born during marriage.
One common scenario is as follows: Ann and Bob have been married for seven
years. It has been a difficult marriage, and both parents have engaged in extramarital affairs. Two children were born during the marriage. Cynthia is now
six and David now four. Recently, during an argument, Ann informed Bob that
he may not be David’s biological father. Genetic testing verified that Bob was
not David’s biological father.

6. Some high profile cases involving babies switched at birth have raised questions about the
maternity and paternity of children. Reproductive technologies have created new opportunities to
bring maternity into question. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). While the Principles’ definition of parent generally applies to both genders,
I focus my comments on men’s parental rights and responsibilities, since these comprise the vast
majority of situations in which such rights and responsibilities come into question.
7. HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 2-5 (1971).
8. For an extended discussion of the history and current legal developments concerning the
marital presumption of paternity, see Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the
Marital Presumption of Paternity, 103 W. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
9. This disclaimer can be made by any individual who has been a social parent to a child in the
context of a marital or cohabiting relationship. Throughout this commentary, I focus on men and
marriage, for cases involving them dominate the case law. However, I attempt to evaluate the proposed principles and make suggestions for an alternative approach that would apply to social parent-child relationships regardless of gender or marital status.
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This painful discovery, together with the high level of strife in their marriage, led Bob to leave the family home and file for divorce and custody. Bob’s
petition acknowledged paternity of Cynthia and requested custody of her; it denied paternity of David and any parental support obligation for him. Until Bob
left the family home and filed his petition, he had acted as David’s father, and
they shared a close parent-child bond. Once he left the family home, Bob refused to visit with David and demanded to visit with and have custody only of
Cynthia. David found this abandonment inexplicable, and his behavior reflects
the trauma he is experiencing. It has created great confusion and pain for
Cynthia as well, who feels guilty that her brother is excluded from her visits
with her father.
This is not the only scenario in which a man who has been acting as a
child’s father denies child support obligations, but it is a recurring situation, one
that has drawn sharply different analyses from different state courts. It also presents the most troubling situation for courts, who struggle to reconcile claims
like Bob’s and needs like David’s.
III. ALI PRINCIPLE OF “ESTOPPEL TO DENY A PARENTAL SUPPORT OBLIGATION”
10

Throughout the Principles, the term “parent” is defined by state law. The
child support obligation is no exception. However, the ALI drafters also sought
to impose the parental support obligation in exceptional circumstances on additional individuals whose “affirmative actions warrant imposition of a continu11
ing support obligation to a child.” The provision adapts equitable estoppel to
the situation of child support. Section 3.02A states that estoppel may arise
when:
(a) there was an explicit or implicit agreement or undertaking by the person to
assume a parental support obligation to the child;
(b) the child was born during the marriage or cohabitation of the person and the
child’s parent; or
(c) the child was conceived pursuant to an agreement between the person and
the child’s parent that they would share responsibility for raising the child and
12
each would be a parent to the child.

The ALI drafters thus invoke situations that expand on the traditional
marital presumption of paternity. Estoppel to deny a parental support obligation applies to children born during the cohabitation as well as during the mar13
riage of the individuals involved. It also applies to children who are conceived
pursuant to or otherwise the subject of an agreement between two individuals to
14
share the parental support obligation. It includes both heterosexual and homo-

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 3, §§ 2.03(1)(a), 3.02(1)(a).
Id. § 3.02A cmt. a.
Id. § 3.02A(1)(a)-(c).
Id. § 3.02A(1)(b).
Id. § 3.02A(1)(a).
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15

sexual unmarried partners. This effort to equalize the treatment of children
born into different family structures is important and long needed.
Only a child and the child’s parents are given standing to assert an estoppel
16
to deny parental support obligation. The court is instructed to consider several
factors when determining whether to impose a support obligation under this
estoppel theory:
(a) whether the person and the child act toward each other as parent and child
and, if so, the duration and strength of that behavior;
(b) whether the parental undertaking of the person supplanted the child’s opportunity to develop a relationship with an absent parent and to look to that
parent for support;
(c) whether the child otherwise has two parents who owe the child a duty of
support and are able and available to provide support; and
(d) any other facts that may relate to the equity of imposing a parental support
17
duty on the person.

The section specifically states that estoppel does not include a continuing
support obligation that arises simply from a person’s cohabitation with or mar18
riage to the child’s parent. The ALI drafters sought to distinguish the simple
“stepparent” situation, in which individuals aid in caring for the children of
their partner or spouse, from ones in which individuals have acted in some affirmative ways to create a continuing support obligation.
IV. EVALUATING ESTOPPEL TO DENY A PARENTAL SUPPORT OBLIGATION
Perhaps most important, the provisions concerning mutual agreements
make an important contribution to the still evolving legal theories of support in
the context of agreements between partners to conceive or share the support obligation for a child. They clarify that these agreements should be binding on all
involved, and they end the many disparities in treatment between children born
during marriage and those born during the cohabitation of their heterosexual or
19
homosexual parents.
The provisions concerning agreements to share parenting responsibilities
involve an affirmative, and presumably knowing and voluntary undertaking by
an individual toward a child. The other factors that the Principles advise courts
to consider focus on the development of a relationship between the individual
and the child, whether that relationship may have supplanted one with a biological parent, and whether the child has two other parents. These factors do

15. Id. § 3.02A cmt. c.
16. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 3, § 3.02A.
17. Id. § 3.02A(2)(a)-(d).
18. Id. § 3.02A(3).
19. Some courts have already begun to enforce similar agreements. See, e.g., Rubano v. Dicenzo,
759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (enforcing parties’ written agreement to allow former partner to have visitation with child).
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not focus on an individual’s voluntary choice to support a child with knowledge
of the child’s biological heritage. Rather, they focus on the effects of a lengthy
parent-child relationship on the child herself.
For example, in one illustration provided by the Principles, a husband is
prevented from denying a support obligation to his eleven-year-old child at the
time of divorce. The explanation given is that his “long occupation of the pater20
nal role has deprived his younger child of other possibilities.” The second illustration involves a husband who discovers that his wife is pregnant with another man’s child and files for divorce while she is still pregnant. Since no
father-child relationship was created and the husband has not supplanted the
child’s opportunity to develop a father-child relationship with his biological father, this husband would not be liable for child support under the Principles’
21
concept of estoppel. Both of these situations involve men who reject children
upon learning that they are not their biological offspring. In the first illustration,
however, the husband is held responsible on the basis of his acceptance of the
paternal role and the passage of time. Thus, the two situations are treated differently based on the length of time that the parent-child relationship developed
prior to genetic testing and the man’s challenge to the parent-child relationship.
The third example exemplifies affirmative conduct by a stepfather that actively interferes with and encourages the legal termination of the child’s rela22
tionship with his biological father. The third illustration is closest to the situation involving explicit or implicit agreements because the stepfather knew that
the child was not his biological child and affirmatively chose to interfere with
the paternity claims of the biological father. These actions, which were intended
to deprive the child of a legal relationship with his biological father, can be
viewed as an implicit agreement to support the child.
The stepfather illustration includes two important factors: knowing and
voluntary conduct by the stepfather and clear interference by the stepfather with
the child’s relationship with his biological father. Imposing a support obligation
on the basis of these two factors has widespread acceptance by courts and is
23
likely to gain acceptance by state legislatures that consider these Principles.
The ALI estoppel principles that go beyond knowing and voluntary acceptance of a parental responsibility are more controversial. The Principles’ discussion of these factors leave many important questions unanswered. They do
not provide clear guidelines for judicial discretion; they ignore the majority
court rule concerning the application of estoppel in child support situations;
they fail to explain the different treatment of men who parent children born
during or before their marriage to the child’s mother; and they ignore the influ-

20. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 3, § 3.02A cmt. a., illus. 6.
21. Id. § 3.02A cmt. d., illus. 7.
22. Id. at illus. 8.
23. See, e.g., Perkins v. Perkins, 383 A.2d 634 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Scott v. Scott, No. C-9527,
1983 WL 35759, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 1983) (man who married mother aware that her infant
was not his biological son, represented him to community as his son, and resisted efforts by biological father to obtain visitation estopped to deny paternity); Nygard v. Nygard, 401 N.W.2d 323 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1986); Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545 (R.I. 1994) (mother relied on husband’s assurances
that he would support her and a child he knew was not his biological offspring in deciding to continue pregnancy and marry husband); T. v. T. 224 S.E.2d 148 (Va. 1976).
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ential and often gendered judicial assumptions concerning morality. Ultimately,
the Comments fail to articulate a strong rationale for their chosen approach.
Due to these failings, the Principles’ approach to estoppel to deny a parental
support obligation is unlikely to achieve the certainty and ongoing support for
children for which it strives.
On their own terms, the factors and the illustrations of estoppel to deny a
parental support obligation leave many questions unanswered. They do not explain what duration and degree of strength of a parent-child relationship is an
adequate basis for estoppel. The illustrations indicate that while an eleven-year
parent-child relationship is an adequate basis for finding equitable estoppel, a
24
relationship that terminates prior to the child’s birth is not sufficient. No guidance is given, however, to ascertain at what point between these two distant
time periods equitable estoppel would become applicable. This lack of guidance
gives judges too much discretion and will lead to widely differing results under
similar facts. In the situation described above, for example, these estoppel factors would not tell courts whether Bob would be required to continue to support
four-year-old David.
Some states have used statutes of limitations to define the length of time
during which challenges to paternity will be permitted. The shortest timeline is
found in Louisiana, which generally only permits challenges during the first six
25
months of the child’s life. Other states have chosen two or five year periods of
26
time. The Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 adopted a five-year statute of limita27
tions, and the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 revised it to two years. Oklahoma
has adopted a two-year statute of limitation, but confines its application to
situations where the parent and the child have lived together for the two year
period. The Oklahoma approach, which looks to readily identifiable factors,
such as the child’s age and residence with the alleged parent, gives courts a
more easily administrable guideline and prevents courts from having to engage
in more detailed, time consuming, and ultimately confounding inquiries into the
28
“strength” of the parent-child bond. Oklahoma’s approach would make it clear
whether Bob would be required to continue to support David in the example
discussed earlier.
The Principles do not acknowledge that their approach to equitable estoppel
bucks the trend in state law, which generally permits men to challenge their pa24. Courts have struggled with these issues as well. See, e.g, Bergan v. Bergan, 572 N.W.2d 272
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (husband who did not know of lack of biological relationship with child not
estopped from contesting paternity where here did so when child was only slightly more than two
years old); Johnson v. Johnson, 286 N.W.2d 886 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (husband estopped from denying paternity where he had fulfilled parenting role for nine or ten years).
25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (West 1993). See also Smith v. Smith, 672 So. 2d 1075 (La. Ct.
App. 1996).
26. Two states, North Dakota and Colorado, that have adopted the five-year limitation, have
refused to apply it to prevent a presumed father from challenging the presumption of paternity in a
child support collection action brought more than five years after the child’s birth. People in re Interest of L.J., 835 P.2d 1265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); In re Interest of K.B., 490 N.W.2d 715 (N.D. 1992).
27. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT vol. v 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a revised version of the UPA in 2000. That version is
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/upa/upa00ps.htm [hereinafter UPA 2000].
28. OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit.10, §§ 2, 3 (West 1993).
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ternity and support obligation at the time of divorce, either affirmatively or as a
defense to a claim for child support. Instead, the reporter’s notes focus on states
that have applied a broad version of estoppel to prevent divorcing husbands
from denying paternity and state that the “common theme” of these cases “is
that the child’s interests may be jeopardized by allowing a husband who has
taken paternal responsibility for his wife’s children to suddenly disclaim them,
leaving them financially and emotionally fatherless, when their biological father
29
may be long gone.”
Most state courts and legislatures have not, however, taken this approach
to paternity challenges at the time of divorce. The Principles’ comments focus on
cases that invoke equitable estoppel when withdrawal of a developed parentchild relationship will cause emotional harm and remove a previously available
30
source of financial support. More state courts, however, permit most men to
disavow at the time of divorce children they have parented during the mar31
riage. States have done this through different means. In some cases, courts
32
have rejected the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to paternity.
Other courts refuse to apply equitable estoppel to husbands who developed a
parent-child relationship without knowledge of the child’s biological heritage or
to situations where the husband did not actively interfere with efforts to obtain
33
financial support from the biological father.
Equitable estoppel generally requires a litigant to show: 1) conduct or
words amounting to a representation; 2) reasonable reliance; and 3) resulting
34
prejudice. Only a few courts have been willing to find that acceptance of the
paternal role during the marriage despite lack of knowledge of the children’s
true biological paternity constituted an adequate basis for finding the first factor

29. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 3, § 3.02A, reporter’s note at 294.
30. See, e.g., Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 710 (1961).
31. Several states permit husbands to deny paternity at the time of divorce. See, e.g., Gann v.
Gann, 705 So. 2d 509 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Smith v. Smith, 845 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1993); Golden v.
Golden, 942 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997); In re Interest of L.J. III, 835 P.2d 1265, 1266-67
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (denial of paternity in divorce proceeding permitted if brought within five
years of child’s birth; no time limit within which to assert nonexistence of the father child relationship as a defense by a presumed father to a claimed duty of support); R.E.H. v. J.M.H., 736 P.2d 1226,
1227 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160 (D.C. 1993); Daniel v. Daniel, 695 So. 2d
1253 (Fla. 1997); Doe v. Roe, 859 P.2d 922 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993); In re Marriage of Adams, 701 N.E.2d
1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); In re Marriage of Cooper v. Cooper, 608 N.E.2d 1386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993);
Crowder v. Commonwealth, ex. rel. Gregory, 745 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Knill v. Knill, 510
A.2d 546 (Md. 1996); Quintela v. Quintela, 544 N.W.2d 111 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996); Ambrose v. Ambrose, 536 S.E.2d 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); In Re Interest of K.B., 490 N.W.2d 715 (N.D. 1992); Swingle v. Swingle, No. 88AP –852, 1989 WL 110995 (Ohio App. Ct. Sept. 26, 1989); Pressley v. Pressley,
No. 03A01-9311-CV-00400, 1995 WL 54490 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1995); TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §
160.110(g)(3) (Vernon 2001); Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); NPA v. WBA,
380 S.E.2d 178 (Va. App. 1989); In re Marriage of A.J.N. & J.M.N., 414 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987).
32. See, e.g., Cochran v. Cochran, 717 N.E.2d 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Harmon v. Harmon, No.
02A01-9709-CH-00212, 1998 WL 835563 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1998); NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178
(Va. App. 1989).
33. See, e.g., Knill, supra note 31, at 546.
34. See, e.g., B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999).
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35

of equitable estoppel, representation. Others argue that it is unfair to impose a
continuing duty of child support where the husband did not knowingly misrep36
resent his parenthood to the child in question.
Many courts, however, have focused their equitable estoppel analyses on
the third prong of the test for equitable estoppel, prejudice or detriment. They
have sharply divided over the question of whether there is prejudice or detriment in these situations. The Principles focus on those courts that find emotional
detriment an adequate basis for equitable estoppel or application of a strict statute of limitations for disavowals of paternity. The majority of courts that have
considered this issue, however, consider emotional detriment to the child beyond the court’s purview and have strictly limited “prejudice” to financial detriment. They also invoke a very narrow concept of financial detriment. The
withdrawal of prior financial support does not meet their definition of detriment. Rather, these courts find detriment only where the husband’s actions directly impeded the identification of and receipt of child support from the bio37
logical father.
The majority view acknowledges that this approach makes the element of
detriment difficult to establish “because it is rarely found that the husband’s
past provision of financial support has worsened the wife’s and child’s claim on
38
other sources of support, including the biological father.” Contrary to the outcome advocated by the Reporters, these courts would not apply equitable estoppel to the husband who seeks to disavow an eleven year father-child relationship, and they would not require Bob, in the hypothetical situation
described above, to continue to support David.
By ignoring the majority of cases that limit detriment to financial detriment,
the Reporters miss the opportunity to fully explain their reasoning and to respond to the reasoning of courts that have chosen to reject or severely limit equitable estoppel. A close examination of the reasoning on behalf of the Principles’ approach to estoppel and the reasoning adopted by the majority of courts
reveals two very different approaches to the underlying issues. These issues involve: the effect of prior financial support and development of a social relationship; the motives of men who seek to disestablish paternity upon divorce; and
basic notions of fairness.
The Principles’ Comments describe challenges to paternity during divorce
as “belated inquiries into the biological paternity of marital children, undertaken
39
long after the family relationship has been well established as a social reality.”

35. See, e.g., Judson v. Judson, No. FA 94 0065962, 1995 WL 476848 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21,
1995) (husband not permitted to deny paternity of twelve and six year old children in divorce proceeding; unclear if court is applying estoppel or best interests of the child); Watts v. Watts, 337 A.2d
350 (N.H. 1975) (ex-husband not permitted to deny paternity after discovery that children were not
his biological offspring where had acknowledged children for fifteen years; “[to] allow defendant to
escape liability for support by using blood tests would be to ignore his lengthy, voluntary acceptance of parental responsibilities”).
36. See, e.g., Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160 (D.C. 1993); NPA, supra note 32, at 178.
37. See, e.g., B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999); K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570 (D.C.
1994); Knill, supra note 31, at 546; Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
38. K.B. v. D.B., 639 N.E.2d 725, 729 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
39. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 3, § 3.02A cmt. d.

GLENNON - FMT.DOC

278 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

09/20/01 9:27 AM

Volume 8:269

2001

Under this view, the well-established parent-child relationship is an important
“fact” that should not be disturbed upon divorce. The underlying assumption is
that the marriage or end of the marriage is irrelevant to the parent-child relationship, which stands on its own after a period of time. In this view, children
become the responsibility of one who fulfilled the parenting role because of the
prior acceptance of responsibility to them.
Courts that reject this approach begin with a quite different premise: they
begin with the general rule that “a parent owes a duty of support only to his or
40
her natural or legally adopted child.” These courts argue that public policy favors encouraging men to treat their wives’ children as their own while the mar41
riage is still intact without fear of later repercussions. This approach, they find,
42
is consistent with strengthening the family. Under this view, the child is bene43
fitted by the assumption of the fathering role during the period of the marriage.
However, this assumption of the fathering role does not create a permanent parent-child relationship. Nor is this relationship seen as interfering with the
child’s right to obtain support from the biological father unless the husband has
44
actively interfered with such efforts. In addition, they argue that basing estoppel solely on the development of a parent-child relationship would make estoppel the norm, not an exceptional circumstance. “To rule . . . that the exception
applies whenever a child has reached an age when he or she could have a
meaningful appreciation of paternity would make the exception the rule and the
45
‘rule’ applicable only to one and two year olds.”
The comments to the Principles differ with these courts on the issue of motive as well. The comments express the belief that if husbands are estopped
from denying a child support obligation, the motive for denying paternity will
be eliminated. The comments state: “. . .a husband estopped to deny a support
obligation under this section may understandably choose to relinquish his inquiry into biological paternity in order to enjoy a parental relationship with the
46
child he is required to support.” The assumption is that the motive to deny the
relationship is purely financial. With that motive removed, the father-child relationship would presumably continue undisturbed.
Some courts have rejected this view of the likelihood that financial respon47
sibility will lead to continuation of the emotional bond. They have found that
an order requiring child support would not prevent a man from publicly declaring that the child is not his, and a support order may “destroy an otherwise
healthy paternal bond by driving a destructive wedge of bitterness and resent48
ment between the father and his child.” While the issue of motive may be resolvable by social science research, no such research is cited by either the courts
or the Principles.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

NPA, supra note 32, at 180.
Knill, supra note 31, at 552.
Id.
Id
Id. at 550.
K.B. v. D.B., 639 N.E.2d at 731 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 3, § 3.02A. cmt. d.
See, e.g, B.E.B., supra note 37, at 519.
Id.
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The Principles’ comments also do not explicitly address the issue of fairness.
The “fairness” of the Principles’ estoppel approach seems to rest on the notion
that a husband’s “long occupation of the paternal role” usually deprives the
49
child of a relationship with the biological father. Fairness is implicitly defined
from the child’s, not the husband’s, perspective. Instead of looking at the husband’s development of the parent-child relationship with knowledge that he
was not biologically related to the child and that his behavior would lead to a
continuing support obligation, the Principles look at the effect of the parent-child
relationship on the child. They assume that a lengthy father-child relationship
50
“naturally” interferes with a child’s relationship with a biological father.
Those courts that have adopted a very narrow notion of equitable estoppel
focus their fairness analysis on the husband, not the child. According to these
courts, imposing a long-term support obligation on a man who, with or without
knowledge of the child’s biological origins, accepted and treated the child as his
own until divorce, would unfairly penalize a man for conduct that public policy
wishes to promote. These courts analogize such men to stepparents, who may
freely support and care for their spouses’ children with no fear of future liability
for their care.
While the question of motive may be subject to empirical research, the
other two fundamental differences between the Principles’ approach and the
majority judicial approach require further exploration. Should continuing financial responsibility be based on the established father-child relationship or
limited to biological connection? Where does “fairness” lie?
An important impediment to the Principles’ analysis of this issue may lie in
an internal logical inconsistency in the Principles’ approach. The Principles distinguish two groups: men who are already married to the child’s mother when
the child is born and men who marry the mother at some time after the child’s
birth. Under the Principles’ approach, the first group of men, who fall within the
common law presumption of paternity, can become obligated to support a child
simply by fulfilling the parental role for an unstated period of time. The second
group of men, commonly referred to as stepfathers, do not become obligated for
child support after the termination of their marriage to a child’s mother, even if
they have participated in an equally well developed parent-child relationship
51
for an equal length of time. While the Principles appear to treat these two
groups of men differently, the only important distinction between them is
whether they were already married to the mother when the child was born. It is
difficult to find a logical basis for making the child support obligation dependent on this distinction. Why does the “social reality” of the father-child relationship gain legal importance only if the husband was wed to the mother at the
time of the child’s birth? If fairness is judged from the perspective of the child,
is this even a relevant factor?
49. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 3, § 3.02A cmt. d.
50. This principle has gained some judicial acceptance. See, e.g., K.T. v. L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866 (W.
Va. 1989).
51. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 3, § 3.02A(3). This reflects state law trends, in which stepfathers are generally not required to furnish a child support after the dissolution of a marriage, and
are likewise usually precluded from seeking custody and visitation after divorce. See generally
MARTHA M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES & THE LAW (1994).
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Courts that have adopted a restrictive approach to equitable estoppel have
analogized men who are married to the mother at the time of the birth of a child
to stepfathers. They have found that while stepfathers may assume the status of
in loco parentis, they are not compelled to continue the parental relationship after
52
they separate from the mother. Likewise, they assert, men who care for their
wives’ children born during marriage as their own do not assume a continuing
53
obligation to do so. Thus, they reject the distinction between these two groups
of men. For the Principles’ approach to equitable estoppel to work, the drafters
must either provide a strong reason to distinguish these two groups of “fathers”
or reconsider the distinction. This requires explicitly acknowledging the basis
for placing responsibility on some nonbiological fathers. Just as the Principles’
approach breaks down the traditional distinctions between children born during
the marriage of their mother and alleged father and children born to unmarried
parents, so too, the approach to estoppel would appear to negate distinctions
between men who are presumed fathers through marriage and stepfathers.
The Principles’ approach, which gives broad discretion to judges, may also
be undermined by gendered assumptions of morality and responsibility. The
Principles’ Comments ignore the gender stereotypes that appear in some opinions. Husbands who did not know that they were not the biological fathers of
their “children” are viewed as innocent victims of scheming, unfaithful women.
Suspicious husbands who do not seek genetic testing are men who are trying to
54
prevent marital strain. Women are assumed to know who the biological father
of their children are, and their decisions to maintain silence are described as dis55
honorable and deceptive. Wives who did inform their husband of the true
source of the conception of their child are still responsible for the later rejection
of the child upon divorce. Husbands, however, who knew about the lack of a
biological connection to the child but assumed a paternal role are often described as honorable men who were trying to hold their families together, not
56
dads who reject children when they no longer are involved with their mothers.
Given the broad discretion that the Principles allow the courts concerning
application of the doctrine of estoppel, these gendered moral judgments about
the conduct of wives and husbands will continue to affect decisions concerning
husbands’ responsiblities to support children born during a marriage. While the

52. NPA, supra note 32, at 181.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 182; T.P.D. v. A.C.D., 981 P.2d 116, 120 (Alaska 1999).
55. Masters, supra note 31, at 503-04 (“[Mother] falsely led [husband] to believe that he was the
children’s biological father. [Mother], not [husband], acted inequitably in leading the children and
[husband] to believe that [husband] was their biological child . . . . [I]f the children have been prejudiced, [mother] is the responsible party.”).
56. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 358 (N.J. 1984) (To invoke equitable estoppel against
a stepfather “would create enormous policy difficulties. A stepparent who tried to create a warm
family atmosphere with his or her stepchildren would be penalized by being forced to pay support
for them in the event of a divorce. At the same time, a stepparent who refused to have anything to
do with his or her stepchildren beyond supporting them would be rewarded by not paying support
in the event of a divorce.”); In re Marriage of A.J.N., 414 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). The courts
are not uniform in this approbation, however. See, e.g., Sekol v. Delsantro, 763 A.2d 405 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2000) (describing trial court’s perception that husband was breaching his ethical and moral obligations to the child and finding paternity by estoppel vacated and remanded on appeal).
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Principles’ approach to estoppel focuses on the effect on the child, these moral
judgments focus on the husband as the primary, innocent victim. This view of
husbands as the innocent victims here requires a response.
Ideally, a child’s parentage should be clearly and definitively determined at
birth. No child should have to endure the discovery that a loved father denies
paternity. Legal avenues to encourage both parents to clearly and permanently
define their parent-child relationships should be encouraged. The state often
forces paternity determinations in order to locate private child support for children on the public dole. It leaves the accurate identification of biological parentage to the option of women who are married or do not choose to seek child
support or state financial assistance in raising their children. This laissez-faire
policy, given the powerful interests that children have in the identification of
their fathers, may need rethinking. In addition, parties who initiate paternity
challenges during divorce or post-divorce should be strongly encouraged to
seek mediation to attempt to prevent feelings of betrayal upon discovering a
spouse’s infidelity or the anger that often surrounds divorce from destroying
otherwise positive parent-child relationships.
These approaches are, however, well beyond the scope of the Principles,
which concern only the legal rules that govern family dissolution. While some
courts have viewed child support as a benefit to the parent receiving it, the Principles, by clearly distinguishing spousal support payments and child support
payments, identify child support as a benefit to the child. Thus, the moral culpability of the mother becomes irrelevant. We must face head on the choice
between a father who may have been deceived about his biological parentage
and a child who has given his love to and become dependent upon that parent.
I believe that this requires us to rethink the “public policy” notion that
stepparents should be encouraged to parent and support children while they are
living with or married to their parent without fear of any future liability toward
the children. We make a fundamental mistake when we encourage adults to
consider parental relationships with children impermanent, incidental to the
adult marital or cohabitation relationship. In none of the cases citing this “public policy” has any evidence been cited that demonstrates that this approach is,
57
in fact, in the interests of children.
My suggested approach rejects the majority rule that has been applied to
both presumed fathers and stepfathers. I believe that a case can be made that in
choosing between the fairness concerns of individuals who may be estopped to
deny parental support obligations and the children who have entered into a relationship with the only father they know, the fairness concerns are strongest for
the children who have at all points been completely incapable of protecting their
interests. While some individuals are innocent victims of deceptive partners,
adults are aware of the high incidence of infidelity and only they, not the chil-

57. Studies demonstrate that children who lose a parent, especially through divorce, show
lower levels of adjustment than other children. Paul R. Amato & Bruce Keith, Parental Divorce and
Adult Well-being: A Meta-analysis, 53 J. MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 43 (1991).
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dren, are able to act to ensure that the biological ties they may deem essential are
58
present.
Under this suggested approach, to develop a parent-child relationship is to
accept a fiduciary responsibility toward the child, one that is not dependent on
59
the continuation of the adult-adult relationship. Individuals who encourage
children to depend on them to fulfill their role as parents have accepted an important position of trust in their lives that cannot be replicated by any other individual. The fiduciary responsibility of parents toward children is an important social norm for the law to enforce. This fiduciary responsibility can develop
outside marriage, and it extends to stepparents as well, if they have assumed the
parental role. The law should discourage adults from treating children they
have parented as expendable when their adult relationships fall apart. It is
adults who can and should absorb the pain of betrayal rather than inflict additional betrayal on the involved children.
While family law cannot wholly protect children from the mistakes and
betrayals of adults, it can at the least prioritize their protection and security. The
Principles adopt this priority at many turns, and makes an effort to do so here.
The estoppel section can reinforce this fundamental value by acknowledging
that individuals who parent children remain responsible for the care and upbringing of those children, even if they later learn that they do not have the biological connection they assumed was there. It should, however, do this in a
manner that limits judicial discretion and creates as much certainty about the
outcome as possible. Thus, I reject open-ended judicial determinations concerning a number of easily disputed factors. Instead, I suggest that a time limit
be established, after which an individual is denied the right to contest the parental support obligation.
I suggest that the estoppel to deny parental support obligation continue to
estop individuals who implicitly or explicitly agreed to parent a child. In addition, I believe that individuals who have for at least two years: 1) cohabited with
the child and the child’s parent, and 2) with that parent’s consent developed a
parent-child relationship with that child, should be estopped from denying a pa60
rental support obligation at the time of family dissolution.
While this approach has some drawbacks, even for the children whose
protection I am trying to place first, it has some important benefits. First, it is
easy to administer. Unlike the Principles’ proposed approach to estoppel, it
clearly limits judicial discretion and will encourage negotiated solutions rather
58. DNA Paternity Testing, now advertised on billboards, in the Yellow Pages, and on the
Internet, is easily available, relatively inexpensive, and can be done in the privacy of one’s own
home.
59. I am grateful to Professor Scott and Dean Scott for their thoughtful development of this concept in Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995).
60. I select two years because it is in accord with the UPA 2000 and states such as Oklahoma
and California. UPA 2000, supra note 27, § 607(a), (b); CAL. FAM. CODE, § 7541 (1994); OKLA. STAT.
ANN, tit. 10, §§ 2, 3 (1998). However, I also believe that the time limit should be subjected to review
based on studies of the attachment of children to their parents, and the age beyond which most children would experience detachment from a parental figure as especially traumatic. Quite possibly, a
shorter timeline should be adopted. In addition, these provisions limit their statutes of limitations to
children born during marriage. I would extend the time limitation to cohabitation relationships that
involve parent-child relationships as well.
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than lengthy and destructive litigation. It is in accord with one of the underlying value choices of the Principles, the rejection of fault as a factor in family dissolution. It gives individuals, usually men, time to obtain genetic testing and
contest paternity, but prevents them from assuming that they may encourage a
parent-child relationship only to cast it aside when they are no longer involved
61
with the mother.
Others have noted the cultural clash between the idea that no-fault divorce
constitutes a “clean break” of the marital relationship and the ongoing, long62
term dependency needs of children. The Principles recognize that the “clean
break” approach is not always an appropriate response to the dissolution of a
marital or long-term cohabitation arrangement. Likewise, adults should be discouraged from searching for ways to obtain a “clean break” from the children
for whom they have voluntarily—if not always with full knowledge of the
child’s biological heritage—accepted responsibility. Instead, the assumption of
the parental role is a fiduciary responsibility that should not be easily cast aside.

61. Professor Grace Glanz Blumberg has pointed out that same fear that imposing financial responsibility on some stepfathers after divorce will open the door to more custody and visitation
claims by stepfathers. See email from Grace Ganz Blumberg, Reporter, ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, to author (Feb. 27, 2001) (on file with author). I note here that I approve of
limiting the right to request child support under the estoppel provision to the child’s parents and the
child. It is my hope that this will aid in limiting the range of this provision in the context of stepparents where a child has two other involved and supportive parents. However, I do intend that in
some instances children will be able to obtain support from more than two parents. This approach
has been adopted by Louisiana. See Smith v. Jones, 566 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App. 1990), and advocated
by Mary Louise Fellows, A Feminist Determination of the Law of Legitimacy, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 195
(1998).
62. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE 147
(1998).

